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1. Imperial Sonderweg or “Transnational Nation”?
The field of U.S. history is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation as the 
traditional historiographical claim to an exceptional national development of the United 
States has received increasing scrutiny by scholars who advocate the internationaliza-
tion of American history.1 Recent transnational histories of the United States as well as 
	 This	tendency	is	analyzed	in:	K.	K.	Patel,	Transatlantische	Perspektiven	transnationaler	Historiographie,	 in:	Ge-
schichte	und	Gesellschaft,	29	(200)	4,	pp.	625-647;	for	a	programmatic	statement,	see:	D.	Thelen,	The	Nation	
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path-breaking work on transatlantic ideational transfers during the era of progressivism 
have shed new light on the international dimension of American history and helped to 
contextualize the nation’s historical development.2
Despite highly innovative work on the historical configurations of U.S. expansionism, 
however, much analysis of the American empire still remains largely shaped by the pow-
erful and enduring legacy of exceptionalist thought.3 At the core of this teleological 
world view rests the thesis of the exceptional position and promise of the United States 
as chosen nation and successful democratic experiment.4 The missionary dimension of 
this world view is saturated with a pronounced anti-European thrust in which the new 
world is transfigured as a counter-model of historical development to the old world. As 
a consequence, American and European approaches to colonial empire are seen by many 
as incompatible, despite their temporal simultaneity largely unrelated.
The following essay on American rule in the Philippines questions such assertions and 
documents the intense interest of the United States in the colonial knowledge of Euro-
pean powers, in particular Great Britain. In contrast to the assertion that contempora-
ries interpreted the U.S. colonial empire as a counter-model to European approaches, a 
closer look at the Philippine case demonstrates the initial intensity with which transfers 
of British colonial ‘know-how’ informed American approaches to colonial warfare and 
governance.
2. Colonial Order I: the Quest for Military Control
After victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired colo-
nies in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean and entered a phase in its national history 
in which empire and colonial state-building were equated with international stability, 
progress, and civilization.5 The Philippine Islands constituted America’s largest colony. 
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of the archipelago since the mid-16th century, and after the defeat of Spain by the United 
States an indigenous liberation movement under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo 
hoped for independence, proclaimed the Philippine Republic, and formed a provisional 
government.6
The administration of William McKinley ignored such aspirations and dispatched ex-
peditionary forces against the remaining Spanish troops on the islands. In December of 
1898, Madrid transferred control over the Philippines to the United States in the Treaty 
of Paris. Simultaneously, Washington rejected the drive for Filipino independence and 
war between Aguinaldo’s poorly equipped troops and the U.S. Army commenced in 
February of 1899.7
More than 125,000 U.S. troops were deployed during the military conquest of the islands 
between 1899 and 1913. More than 4,200 U.S. soldiers were killed and 3,500 wounded. 
The Filipino forces lost at least 20,000 soldiers, and estimates of the number of civilian 
casualties range from 250,000 to 750,000, approximately ten percent of the pre-war 
population.8
Despite the strong U.S. military presence and technological superiority, the United States 
encountered great difficulties in breaking Filipino resistance. In addition, the environ-
mental and climatic conditions in the colony posed a severe challenge to troops unaccus-
tomed to the tropics and drastically increased the soldier’s disease susceptibility. While 
about ten percent of U.S. troops were wounded in battle, some regiments reported a fifty 
percent loss due to tropical diseases.9
The political and military leadership in Washington assigned the improvement of health 
conditions among soldiers a top priority, and U.S. military surgeons soon explored the 
experiences of neighboring European colonial armies in the tropics in the quest for trans-
ferable know-how. The British case soon emerged as the most trusted and relied on refer-
ence point for improvements to America’s colonial army.10
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This ironic twist, that an ex-colony turned empire now relied on advice from its former 
imperial center from which it had separated in a bloody war for independence, was the 
latest manifestation of a fundamental transformation in Anglo-American relations in 
the second half of the 19th century.11 This “great rapprochement” (Bradford Perkins) was 
fostered and accompanied by and accelerated through the transfer of power in the inter-
national system from British dominance to American primacy.12 It was mainly character-
ized by peaceful crisis management (i.e. the Venezuela Boundary Crisis 1895/1896), the 
extension of mutual support in international affairs (i.e. during the Spanish-American 
War of 1898 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902), intensified transnational rela-
tions, and the development of a strong sense of kinship between Britain and the United 
States.13 American entrance into the club of colonial powers benefited from and simulta-
neously contributed to the intensification of this rapprochement process.
Only months after the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American war, Lt. Colonel Robert 
O’Reilly, designated chief surgeon for the American occupation force in Cuba and later 
surgeon general of the United States, embarked on an inspection tour of Jamaica to study 
the lessons learned by the British with regards to the housing, clothing, and feeding of 
soldiers stationed in the tropics.14
O’Reilly’s recommendations had far reaching consequences for the U.S. Army’s sanitary 
and medical policies. His report facilitated the introduction of new khaki colored uni-
forms and tropical helmets. It also supported the development of procedures for food 
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tion tour provided pragmatic arguments for the improvement of military barracks and 
the building of the highland-sanatorium “Camp John Hay” as part of the construction of 
a summer-capital in Baguio, two-hundred and sixty kilometers north of Manila.15
The construction of this sanatorium was part of a new approach to troop rotation de-
veloped by army surgeons in close collaboration with their British counterparts. From a 
medical point of view, the climatic conditions in the Philippines were deemed detrimen-
tal to the health, and consequently the fighting performance, of U.S. soldiers. Many sur-
geons thus recommended frequent rest and recuperation in non-tropical climate zones, 
ideally in the United States.
As the temporary return to the United States for large amounts of troops was deemed too 
costly and logistically inefficient, regiments would rotate between high- and lowlands to 
allow for recuperation and tropical acclimatization and thus serve an important military 
function. As the head surgeon for the Philippine Department argued: 
Camp John Hay is as necessary to U.S. troops as the hill stations of India are to English 
troops […] Without Baguio, in the present lengthened tropical tour of service, a decided 
increase in insanity, in border line cases of various psycho-neuroses, and in tuberculosis 
would be inevitable.16
In the ‘battle’ against the degenerative impact of tropical conditions, O’Reilly had also 
recommended the recruitment of troops deemed accustomed to such environmental 
challenges. He specifically suggested the creation of African-American regiments, a pol-
icy which was begun in 1899.17 The logical next step was to follow the British approach 
completely and to raise indigenous colonial support troops in the Philippines.18
His recommendation, however, encountered initial resistance. In March of 1899, the 
Washington Post printed the headline “Not to have a Native Army: Methods of Imperial-
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Although authorized by the new army law to recruit an army of 35,000 in the colonial 
possessions, the President will not avail himself of the opportunity. The real reason for 
this decision is said to be a desire to avoid as much as possible all appearance of imitating 
imperialistic England. In other words, the native troops of India are to have no counter-
part in the United States.19
There were several reasons for President McKinley’s initial hesitancy to appropriate the 
tested British model, all of which were less informed by an American desire to stay aloof 
of European colonial models than by political maneuvering. For one, the Democratic 
Party, whose platform remained strongly opposed to empire, had suggested a congres-
sional amendment to the 1899 Army Organization Bill to allow the replacement of 
homeward bound American troops with native soldiers. The opposition thus envisioned 
that the re-organization of the colonial army along British lines would ease a future with-
drawal from the islands and eventually end America’s ‘adventure’ of colonial empire.
In addition, the presidential hesitancy was also a response to reservations about arming 
the colonized, expressed by a number of congressional and military leaders in Washing-
ton. In this context, the British experience served as a negative foil for imagined and 
anticipated disastrous consequences of arming Filipinos. In this discursive context, the 
British example was used as a warning with frequent references to the 1857 Sepoy Rebel-
lion. As Augustus Bacon of Georgia argued on the floor of the U.S. Senate: 
[…] I shall never forget the impression made upon me in looking at the pictorial news-
papers […] with the pictures of the sepoys bound to the mouths of cannon and blown to 
pieces […] I do not want any such transactions under the American flag.20
This negative disposition was not uncommon, as long as the assumption prevailed that 
the U.S. Army would quickly and decisively end the war in victory. As the campaigns 
dragged on and as the numbers of American casualties increased, military and civilian 
resistance to a colonial support army all but vanished. The British model of arming large 
numbers of natives in the colonies now became the order of the day in the American 
Philippines. By 1901 the first native regiments were founded which would ultimately 
grow close to 10,000 native soldiers in the Philippines and another 7,000 in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. They formed an important part, in some parts of the Philippines certainly 
the backbone of the colonial army.
In addition to the continuous inter-imperial ideational exchanges on military matters, 
the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) afforded the American military an unprecedented 
opportunity to compare its actions in the Philippines with British colonial warfare in 
South Africa. This war was an important milestone on the way to the close association 
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the rapprochement between both powers and utilized the conflict as a platform for the 
celebration of Anglo-Saxon unity.21
Yet, American support for the British cause in South Africa and the nation’s infatuation 
with British colonial ‘know-how’ was widely debated in the United States. The anti-imperialists 
who had failed to prevent the creation of an American overseas empire utilized the South 
African War to condemn their own nation’s imperial policies.22 Nationally acclaimed 
journalists and publicists and many members of Congress, particularly from the Demo-
cratic Party, portrayed the Boer War as a struggle for independence of a heroic people 
against the commercial interests of an unjust empire. British strategy in South Africa, in 
particular the introduction of the concentration policy, did much to damage the image 
of the Empire in substantial segments of the American public.
In December 1900, American writer and social commentator Mark Twain emphasized 
this downside of Anglo-Saxon cooperation with his scathing critique of the British and 
American colonial wars. At a dinner in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York he intro-
duced Winston Spencer Churchill with the words: 
For years I’ve been a self-appointed missionary to bring about the union of America and 
the motherland. […] Yes, as a missionary I’ve sung my songs of praise. And yet I think 
that England sinned when she got herself into a war in South Africa which she could 
have avoided, just as we sinned in getting into a similar war in the Philippines. Mr. 
Churchill, by his father, is an Englishman; by his mother he is an American – no doubt 
a blend that makes the perfect man. England and America; yes we are kin. And now 
that we are also kin in sin, there is nothing more to be desired. The harmony is complete, 
the blend is perfect.23
The supporters, on the other hand, activated the sentiment of Anglo-Saxonist kinship 
and portrayed the Anglo-Boer War as an example for the advance of civilization.24 In 
this discourse the Boers appeared as backward looking people who stood in the way of 
progress and would benefit from the uplifting effects of British colonial rule. For the sup-
porters of an American empire, Anglo-American solidarity and lesson-learning from the 
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and Alfred Thayer Mahan, Anglo-Saxonism provided a powerful impetus and reassuring 
racialized ideological framework.
The concept advanced the argument that the civilization of the English-speaking nations 
was superior to that of any other nation because of allegedly inherited racial traits and 
characteristics, in particular industry, intelligence, adventurousness, and talent for self-
government. Those abilities were contrasted with the accomplishments of other races in 
a hierarchy of racial success.25 Advocates emphasized that Anglo-Saxonism had provided 
the basis for the perfection of democratic government and that Britain and America 
were consequently ideally suited for the civilizational uplift of the imperial mandate. 
In addition, Anglo-Saxonism fused with a social-Darwinist conception of international 
relations turned colonialism into a racial mission and obligation for the betterment of 
global conditions.
Such racial interpretations of Anglo-American cooperation and the South African War 
were complemented by a number of less mundane and very pragmatic considerations. 
The simultaneity of America’s colonial war in the Philippines and Britain’s war in South 
Africa offered multiple connections for those Americans charged with the military secur-
ity of the empire. The U.S. government sent observers to South Africa to study British 
military tactics, military hardware and medical progress for applicability to America’s 
own colonial war in the Philippines.26 Most importantly, the simultaneous military 
blunders of both nations resulted in an intensive Anglo-American discourse on improv-
ing the professionalism of the armed forces and enabled close collaboration on military 
reform which laid the foundations for the long-lasting defense cooperation of Britain 
and America.27
In addition, the simultaneity of events enabled American advocates of empire to frame 
their support and their understanding of American actions in the Philippine theater 
through reference to British experience and behavior. This discursive strategy, the Brit-
ish Empire as reassuring reference point for the moral propriety of American actions, 
became widespread after the American military conduct in the archipelago came under 
close scrutiny and public criticism in the United States. In particular the so-called con-
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(the so-called ‘water-cure’) by American soldiers interrogating Filipino prisoners of war, 
were in part legitimized by reference to British tactics during the Boer War.28
The executive and the military leadership’s approach at first questioned the credibility of 
the charges. But after more and more witnesses of torture and abuse came forward, the 
government argued that American actions had been an appropriate response, morally 
justified by the brutality of the guerilla war waged against the colonizers by the independ-
ence movement. In a third and final step and in response to increasing Congressional 
demand for the court-martial of important commanders in the Philippine campaign, 
advocates of imperial expansion responded with frequent references to British actions in 
South Africa and claimed the moral superiority of the Anglo-American cause in taking 
up the “White Man’s Burden”. The analogies drawn from the empire’s war against the 
Boers were to contextualize American actions as ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ responses by an 
army confronted with a guerilla enemy. “So we see,” the Washington Post argued, “that 
the United States does not stand alone in having furnished isolated cases of bad conduct 
toward an inferior people or in exposing and punishing them. Human nature is very 
much alike everywhere.”29
The army in the Philippines had followed the example set by its British cousins in Africa, 
so the argument went. And because the empire was considered the most enlightened 
imperial power of all, American actions that followed the British example could not be 
considered indicative of a break-down of moral order. War was hell, and moral scruples 
about the conduct of troops, in South Africa or in the Philippines, were, according to 
many enthusiasts of empire, simply out of place as they irresponsibly delayed victory and 
thus slowed down the march of civilization: 
There is nothing easier than to criticize army movements from the comfortable seclusion 
of a library chair. […] war is stern and cruel, and cannot reasonably be anything else 
[…] War means fighting and fighting means killing.30
The analogies of the South African and Philippine-American wars utilized the Anglo-
Saxonist rhetoric of racial solidarity. The common war experience fostered not only 
an intense inter-imperial discourse on the applicability and transferability of colonial 
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3. Colonial Order II: the Quest for Administrative Control
The military conquest of the Philippines was accompanied by the American search for an 
appropriate model of colonial governance for the islands. In the government’s program 
of research and fact-finding on all matters colonial, the British Empire quickly emerged 
as the leading reference point as it had in colonial military affairs. Many contemporary 
American analysts and observers praised the advantages of British rule, the efficiency of 
its colonial administration, and its enlightened approach to colonial state building.
In part, this pro-British Empire attitude was enabled by a discursive conceptual dif-
ferentiation between what contemporaries described as ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ forms 
of imperial control.32 ‘Negative’ imperialism was characterized by conquest, the mere 
desire for profit and the resulting exploitation of the indigenous population. ‘Positive’ 
imperialism on the other hand aimed at order out of chaos and placed great emphasis on 
fostering the development and civilizational ‘uplift’ of the colonized. This distinction and 
the accompanying re-interpretation of British rule in India in particular, enabled many 
American proponents of overseas expansion to openly praise the accomplishments of the 
British Empire.33
In December of 1899, Secretary of War, Elihu Root, the chief architect of America’s 
colonial policies, described the mechanics of inter-imperial knowledge transfer in a letter 
to a friend:
The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of 
books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial 
government under the English law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from 
my active duties.34
The secretary kept a reference library of mostly British texts on colonial law and ad-
ministration in his office and considered the systematic evaluation of the activities of 
other colonial powers an essential guide to American decision-making. So did the State 
Department under Secretary of State John Hay who instructed American diplomats in 
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, to collect and forward compre-
hensive analyses of those nations’ colonial policies.35
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President William McKinley followed a similar direction and ordered the First Philip-
pine Commission, a fact-finding committee under the direction of Cornell University 
president Jacob Gould Schurman, to collect information on modes of colonial govern-
ance in preparation for American rule in the Philippines. This commission carefully 
studied the situation in the archipelago and compiled substantial data and analyses on 
the colonial practice of other powers in the region. In this context, Montague Kirkwood, 
a British lawyer who had already served as an advisor to the Japanese colonial adminis-
tration of Formosa, prepared a thorough analysis of the administrative, judicial, social, 
and military dimensions of British rule in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Federated Malay 
States, and the Straits Settlement. This analysis “Administration of British Colonies in 
the Orient” was included in the final four-volume Report of the Philippine Commission to 
the President officially presented on January 21, 1900.36
The recommendations of colonial experts were accompanied by the massive research pro-
gram initiated by the Library of Congress and a number of government departments to 
collect information from all colonies and dependencies worldwide.37 Some of the results, 
such as the Treasury Department’s report The Colonial Systems of the World received wide-
spread distribution and remained in use for years as standard reference texts in executive 
as well as legislative deliberations on colonial policies.38 Its conclusions confirmed the 
McKinley administration’s particular interest in the emulation of British models:
The most acceptable and therefore most successful of the colonial systems are those in 
which the largest liberty of self-government is given to the people. The British colonial 
system, which has by far outgrown that of any other nation, gives, wherever practicable, 
a large degree of self-government to the colonies.39
Advocacy of learning from the British Empire was not limited to governmental decision-
making circles but was complemented by a widespread public discourse, carried out in 
the nation’s magazines and newspapers. Their contributions often extensively praised the 
accomplishments of British colonial rule as the American public was introduced to the 
intricacies of colonial law, administration, and comparative colonial trade. The crown’s 
representatives in Egypt, the Malay Straits, India, and Hong Kong became icons of pop-
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During this period of intense search for colonial models, universities, professional or-
ganizations, and scholarly journals also placed themselves at the service of empire. In 
particular, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and economists advanced the call 
for close inter-imperial learning and initiated numerous research projects into a wide 
variety of colonial issues.40 The nation’s universities established courses in comparative 
colonial administration and economy relying heavily on British expertise.41 The Univer-
sity of Chicago even appointed a Colonial Commissioner, Alleyne Ireland, who gained 
prominence as a prolific writer, government advisor, and ardent proponent of transplant-
ing British colonial methods to America’s new overseas territories.42
On the colonial frontier, Americans also tapped into the resources of British imperial 
experience. They devoured the writings and reminiscences of imperial administrators 
such as Lord Cromer, frequently visited British colonies in the neighborhood, conducted 
inspection tours in Egypt and India, and traveled halfway around the world to meet top-
level officials of the Empire’s colonial civil service.43 Or they simply visited the colonial 
office in London like Captain George Langhorne, who recalled later: 
[…] in 1899, en route to the Philippines for the first time, I passed through London 
and went to the colonial office there, and […] asked the officials if they had any colony 
where the people were similar to those in these islands. They then told me of the Malay 
States and gave me a number of blue books, reports, etc […] They were of much use in 
the associations I had with the Filipinos during my first tour in Luzon.44
Despite their enthusiasm for the British record of colonial empire, those charged with 
the development of American colonial state-building emphasized that the appropriation 
of European, and in particular British, models would strive for a balance between outside 
input and national traditions. For Secretary Root for example it was imperative: 
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To take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially 
Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental 
principles of our own government, which lead to certain necessary conclusions which 
don’t exist in Great Britain or Holland, notwithstanding the spirit of liberty and free-
dom in both those countries.45
This flexible approach resembled what theorists of cultural transfer have described as ap-
propriation and rejection. Information is borrowed freely from the experience of others, 
reconfigured, and applied to a new context.46 The British experience of empire thus pro-
vided an intellectual framework within which Americans could discuss their own ideas 
about colonial rule.47 The insights from inter-imperial exchanges were pitted against the 
nation’s core values and earlier experiences with continental expansion.
Those experiences suggested the evolutionary nature of the American system of progres-
sion from territory to statehood as exemplified by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and 
the administration of the Louisiana Territory.48 Territories would pass through a state of 
preparation during which the inhabitants would acquire basic experience and training 
for self-government. It was this sense of progression that inspired the tendency to dif-
ferentiate between American and British approaches to colonial administration. While 
London focused on the development of colonial infrastructures, Americans would focus 
on the preparation of the colonized for self government and eventual independence.
For the Philippines this produced a dual approach. The administrative framework for the 
northern half of the archipelago resembled that of a British crown colony. The sovereign 
power retained complete legislative and executive authority over the islands, as the Fili-
pinos were deemed largely unfit for popular participation in government and because the 
continued war in the archipelago made it impossible for American government to give 
too much power to locally elected representatives before not total control had been estab-
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In the southern half of the islands, in Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan populated by Mus-
lim ethnic groups described by the Spaniards as Moros, Washington at first followed the 
indirect rule model established by Britain in the Malay Straits, where British officials 
governed in the name of Malay sultans. Americans perceived this framework of colonial 
rule as a system that preserved indigenous structures of authority while securing strict 
British control over revenues and expenditures.
In July of 1899, Brigadier-General John Bates negotiated a treaty with the Moros in 
which indigenous rulers recognized the supreme authority of the United States and 
promised to suppress piracy in exchange for economic subsidies and relative freedom 
of action.49 The main goal of this agreement was to prevent the southern islands from 
joining the independence struggle of the North led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Once the 
independence army had been defeated by the summer of 1902, the Bates-Treaty and its 
concept of indirect rule was increasingly seen by the colonial government as an obstacle 
to colonial state-building in the Philippines.
This process aimed at integrating the various components of the Philippines into one 
colony under complete American control. The widespread practices of polygamy and 
slavery among the Moros defined them as backward and uncivilized in American eyes 
and resulted in the preferential treatment of the northern Christian Filipinos over the 
Muslim South. A heterogeneous alliance of church leaders, abolitionists, progressive re-
formers, and staunch imperialists exerted increasing pressure on the U.S. government to 
abandon the British model of indirect rule which was increasingly considered a liability. 
As Leonard Wood, first governor of the Moro Province wrote to an English friend: 
You are quite content to maintain rajahs and sultans and other species of royalty, but 
we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our scheme of 
government, and so have to start at this kind of proposition a little differently.50
Such an approach, Wood admitted, might work within the British system but would 
be counterproductive to America’s long-term plans. Wood and other colonial officials 
became more assertive in their suggestion that the history of Indian-white relations dur-
ing the Euro-American conquest of the American West provided ample guidance for 
an effective system of governance for the southern Philippines.51 The Bureau of Insular 
Affairs, the American equivalent to the colonial office in London, devised removal plans 
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War One to subjugate the Moros and militarily prepare their assimilation into main-
stream colonial society.52
4. Epilogue: The Renaissance of Exceptionalism 
The St. Louis world’s fair, officially called Louisiana Purchase International Exposition, 
opened its gates to the public on April 30th, 1904.53 Visitors were introduced to a 
dazzling spectacle of revolutionary technologies, such as new modes of transportation 
and communication. In addition, the fair also developed a coherent vision of America’s 
new empire through presentations of the colonial ‘other’. Ethnographic displays were an 
integral feature of world’s fairs and international expositions. The display of ‘exotic’ races 
typically emphasized their backwardness and state of savagery and thus provided impe-
rial self-assurance and entertainment in the colonial metropolis often under pseudo-
 scientific disguises.
At the St. Louis World’s Fair anthropological exhibits reached unknown highs with the 
largest ethnographic shows ever. More than 2,000 natives were brought to the fair from 
all corners of the globe and displayed in large supposedly natural and indigenous habi-
tats, much like a human zoo. To be sure, as at other fairs, the display of the ‘exotic’ served 
the colonial propaganda also in St. Louis. But the Louisiana Purchase Exposition also 
provided a radical departure in the tradition of ethno-shows and ethnographic displays 
by outlining the possibility of inclusion through educational uplift.
So far, the ‘exotic other’ had simply provided a static backdrop for the social Darwinist 
ideology of colonial supremacy. The nations of the ‘civilized world’ were supposedly 
engulfed by a world of darkness in which dangerous and benighted races threatened the 
course of progress. Their fate was extinction, their potential for change negligible. The St. 
Louis world’s fair gave those colonial discourses a distinct American accent by insisting 
on the dynamic nature of progressive evolution. In a paternalistic ideology of uplift, 
progress and inclusion into the one world was to be achieved through benevolent assimi-
lation. The process was deemed difficult and tedious, and not everyone would succeed.
This emphasis on the possibility of change, of progress through enlightenment, permeated 
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attempted a new outlook, in conscious contrast to Europe, on the colonial system, the 
predominant system of order for large parts of the world in the early 20th century. As a 
colonial power, it suggested that progress and civilization could flow to even the remotest 
corners of the earth and rejected those who insisted on fixing the current division of the 
one world for eternity. 
The fair’s most popular ethnographic display, the Philippine exposition, reflected this 
conceptual departure from what Americans perceived to be the European way of colonial 
rule. At the displays’ center was a gigantic habitat onto which more than 1,200 members 
of various ethnic groups from the archipelago were temporarily resettled. This ‘human 
zoo’ became the unrivalled attraction of the fair.54
The ‘Philippine Reservation’, as it came to be called, had several goals: it was to dissemi-
nate information about America’s largest colony, project the image of a pacified posses-
sion, contain anti-imperial critique during the elections of 1904, discursively integrate 
the colonization of the islands into a national narrative of progress and expansion, and 
firmly establish the United States as a benevolent alternative to European approaches to 
colonial empire in the public mind.
The fair organizers reflected the importance which colonial state-building in the Philip-
pines afforded social engineering projects. The civilizational potential of the colonized 
and the ‘benevolence’ of the colonizer found its symbolic unity in the model school of 
the Philippine habitat in which 40 Filipinos received daily elementary instruction in 
front of more than 2,000 visitors.55 Educational reform in the Philippines was indeed 
an important project of American colonial governance.56 It was intended to prepare the 
colonized for eventual participation in administration, military, or educational roles. 
The small model school on the exhibition grounds was to convey this message including 
its rhetorical return of the colonial discourse to the idea of exceptional mission and to a 
tendency of discursive demarcation from European models of colonial governance. The 
message appeared to have resonated with the audience, as one visitor remarked: “Other 
countries fear the education and enlightenment of the people over whom they exercise 
sovereignty. The United States fears ignorance.”57
As the recruitment of Filipinos for the colonial bureaucracy accelerated, such pro-
nounced demarcation from the old world strongly shaped debates over the appropriate 
54	 The	Philippine	exposition	is	described	in:	J.	D.	Fermin,	904	World’s	Fair:	The	Filipino	Experience,	Quezon	City	
2004;	N.	J.	Parezo	/	D.	Fowler,	Anthropology	Goes	to	the	Fair:	The	904	Louisiana	Purchase	Exposition,	Lincoln	
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approach to colonial governance. Americans increasingly transfigured their country’s 
colonial enterprise into a mission for nation-building as they simultaneously began to 
question the model character of the British Empire. Many observers in the United States 
suggested that while the European colonial powers were by and large interested in the 
retention of their power, Washington’s colonial policies remained mostly interested in 
the preparation of the colonized for ultimate self-government and independence. Within 
this interpretive framework, the U.S. colonial empire aimed at ‘benevolent assimilation’ 
and civilization ‘uplift’ and not colonial rule and even exploitation ad infinitum.
In his State of the Union Address of December 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt had 
already outlined the core idea for this argumentative thrust:
Not only does each Filipino enjoy such rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
as he has never before known during the recorded history of the islands, but the people, 
taken as a whole, now enjoy a measure of self-government greater than any granted to 
any other Orientals by any foreign power. […] Taking the work of the army and the 
civil authorities together it may be questioned whether anywhere else in modern times 
the world has seen a better example of real constructive statesmanship than our people 
have given to the Philippine Islands.58
This self-transfiguration of the new colonial masters into anti-colonial agents of devel-
opment, who aimed at turning the Philippines into: “[…] a sort of glorified Iowa,” 59 
quickly took hold and began to shape and define the parameters of the U.S. colonial 
discourse. Francis Burton Harrison, the governor general of the islands from 1913–1921, 
even went so far as to re-interpret the U.S. approach to the Philippines as an anti-colonial 
model which had irritated the established European colonial powers and created distress 
for their justifications of rule: 
The result of our heresy have been far-reaching, and have shaken seriously the colonial 
offices of Great Britain, of France, and of Holland; they have also brought hope and 
inspiration to millions of patient brown and yellow men who find in the new ideas of 
America a promise for the future.60
This discursive location of the colonial project as anti-colonial civilizing mission was 
designed to rhetorically bridge the national divide on the compatibility of republic and 
empire and simultaneously seal the ideological and moral super-elevation of the nation 
in demarcation from the old world. In the long run, this tendency has fostered a sense of 
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ism.61 It has masked the memory for a time in which the British Empire served the Unit-
ed States as an admired and trusted reference point, worthy of emulation, a model for 
the American way of colonial empire; a time in which American colonial planners sought 
British advice in many areas from tropical medicine to colonial governance and colonial 
urban planning to colonial warfare. In this inter-imperial discourse on the transfer of 
colonial ‘know-how’ in the early 20th century, many American contemporaries perceived 
their empire not as exceptional but connected their colonialism to what they understood 
to be a much larger, world-encompassing Anglo-Saxon mission.
6	 On	the	pervasive	sense	of	colonial	amnesia:	A.	Kaplan,	Violent	Belongings	and	the	Question	of	Empire	Today:	
Presidential	Address	to	the	American	Studies	Association,	October	7,	200,	in:	American	Quarterly,	56	(2004)	,	
pp.	-8.
